4 Peirce's Semiotic
2Peirce's doctrine of signs and semiosis1 was the beginning of a theory that other semioticians expounded upon and helped advance. In 1867, Peirce expressed the following sentiment:
45I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labour too great, for a first-comer (sic). (1992: 284)
6 His theory of signs posits that the universe is comprised of signs and sign systems; it also specifies what is required of these signs for semiosis to occur. Peirce stated: ‘‘Semiotics is knowledge about semiosis; it is the theoretical accounting for signs and what they do’’ (Deely 1990: 105).
7 Any investigation into Peirce's semiotic must begin with the question: What is the nature of a sign such that it makes semiosis possible? This question may be applied to the various roles the sign plays in architecture, the fine arts, literature, anthropology, and science. The role of the sign and its objectivity,2 and what is distinctive about such objectivity in the sign being analyzed, are questioned. The sign's objectivity in these disciplines is based upon the sign's signification, (Ibid: 106) production, and interpretation (Innis 1985: viii). Semiosis has to depend upon the interpreter's experience and knowledge concerning the action or processes in which the sign is involved in (Deely 1990: 51). According to Umberto Eco, semiosis is a communication process; it ‘‘ …is the process by which empirical subjects communicate, communication processes being made possible by the organization of signification systems’’ (1976: 316). Eco's semiosis describes how a culture produces and assigns meanings to signs; he therefore views semiosis as a product of culture and society.
9 John Deely extends this idea of semiosis as a cultural product into the realm of plant and animal environments. He claims that:
1011So far we have noted that semiosis, in the fullest sense of the action of signs, extends well beyond the boundaries of culture,
12as even well beyond the boundaries of animal societies, to include the dynamics of plant life and even the dynamics of chemistry and physics down to the quantum level insofar as there is a question of future outcomes and law governed interaction. Our concentration has been on the explicit absorption and redistribution of elements of [the] physical environment within the relational network of [the] objective world through cognitively mediated experience, [brackets mine] (1990: 67)
13 Deely recognizes that the action of the sign processes involves human experience, as well as that of all organisms in their relationship with their environment. The environment is seen as a sign system in and of itself (Ibid: 73), and this system includes all the organisms contained within it.
14 The American anthropologist, David Clarke, argues that Peirce's semiotic is a logical discipline and not an empirical science. Clarke believes that Peirce's semiotic describes certain aspects of the sign as it is used by any organism capable of learning from experience; it is not based upon aspects that are found within the empirical sciences (1990: 58). In this manner, Peirce's semiotic is considered a normative science taking into account that ideas are based upon logic (Ibid: 62). To Clarke, Peirce relies upon the logical interpretation of how the sign stands for an object (Ibid: 83).
15 Meanings, according to the American semiotician Charles Morris, cannot exist without the interpretation of signs and 'semiotic', the general study of signs. They are disclosed as a relationship between meaning and action (or behavior). Morris suggests that semiotic itself is to be developed as a behavioral theory (1970:16).
16 In summary, Peirce uses various qualities of human experience, habit and law; he also uses deductive logic, and the general theory of signs or semiotic. He asserts that human experience and thought are communicated or signified through signs. Clarke notes that Peirce's theory of signs may be approached as a theory of experience or phenomenology (1990: 62). It is Peirce's belief that ideas may be signs that involve the mind's interpretation of various sign processes or semiosis, in other words, the action among signs (Innis 1985: 3).
17 Peirce's Concept of Sign
18 For Peirce, the sign is an important aspect of the process of semiosis (Zeman 1977: 26). Peirce defines the sign as ‘‘…something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity’’ (Peirce 1985: 5). A sign also may stand ‘‘…for something to the idea which it produces or
19 modifies’’ (Fitzgerald 1966: 40). The sign is comprised of the object for which the sign stands and is a process that occurs in the interpreter's mind, known as the interpretant (Ibid: 40). Peirce's sign is the relationship that exists between the sign and its object. He believes that it is this relationship that will determine the cognitive sign that stands for the object (Peirce 1985: 5).
20 Anthropologist David Clarke reiterates Peirce's notion of the sign by noting, ‘‘a sign is any object of interpretation, a thing or event that has significance for some interpreter. It can stand for some object for this interpreter, signify an action to be performed, arouse in the interpreter a feeling or emotion, or combine two or more of these functions’’ (1990: 1). Examples of what constitute signs for Clarke are ideas, natural events such as actions that take place within the environment, diagrams and drawings resembling the object they are representing, and sentences that follow certain grammatical structures or rules (Ibid: 24).
21 ‘‘I propose to define as a sign,’’ writes Umberto Eco, ‘‘everything that, in the grounds of a previously established social convention, can be taken as something standing for something else’’ (1976: 16). Like Peirce, Eco believes that everything in the environment is a sign, and that the natural environment is a conglomeration of signs (Ibid: 15). He gives the example of smoke as a sign of fire. The fire need not be perceived along with the smoke; the smoke acts as a sign through the ‘‘social rule’’ that smoke is associated with fire (Ibid: 17). Eco adds the role of society as an important aspect in determining what is defined as a sign. A sign develops through the conventions of a particular community. The community agrees to and establishes the various meanings that a certain action, object or word can have.
22 The action of a sign relates to Peirce's semiosis. Eco echoes Peirce in defining semiosis as ‘‘ …an action, or influence, which is, or involves, an operation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into an action between pairs’’ (1984: 1). The sign, in the process of semiosis, becomes a sign in a philosophical manner (Ibid: 10).
23 According to Eco, in the process of semiosis, the object may function as the central object of semiotics if one decides that a category can describe a series of human as well as animal behaviors, (vocal, visual, ter- mic, gestural, etc.) (Ibid: 7). Eco points out that the most important questions pertaining to semiosis are: What does it mean for animals and humans to convey or communicate ideas or aspects of the universe? Do they express these by verbal means only, and what are the similarities that are to be found between verbal and nonverbal communication (Ibid: 7)?
24 Peirce's Semiosis: Sign, Object, and Interpretant
25 In Peirce's semiosis, there are three relata involved: the Sign, the Object and the Interpretant (Zeman 1977: 24--5). The triadic relationship of these three occurs among the Sign itself (which can be a physical object, image, quality, idea) and, what the sign stands for —its Object—, and the Interpretant (Goudge 1969: 139). The Sign is an object that exists in the world. The Object is a sign that functions alone; it may be understood by one person and not another. In this respect, the Object functions as an aspect of a person's consciousness (Zeman 1977: 25).
26 The Object is active in semiosis in two ways. This duality of the Object may be determined by the notion that the Object is either a Dynamical Object, ‘‘…the efficient but not immediately present Object,’’ or the Immediate Object, ‘‘…the Object as the sign represents it’’ (Peirce 1958/8: 232). Peirce exemplifies this duality in the sentence, ‘‘The sun is blue.’’ The Objects of the sentence are ‘‘the sun’’ and ‘‘blueness.’’ Peirce noted that the word ‘‘blueness’’ functions as the Immediate Object, or ‘‘the quality of the sensation,’’ which is made known through a person's feelings. He claimed that the Immediate Object is the ‘‘sundry sensations’’ the sun produces (Peirce 1958/8: 138). The Dynamical Object is the existential relationship; the emitted light is the Dynamical Object, and involves the perception of the sensation that relates its location, mass and volume (Peirce 1958/8:138).
27 Peirce argued:
2829It is true of both Immediate and Dynamical Object that Acquaintance cannot be given by a Picture of a Description, nor by any other sign which has the Sun for its Object. If a person points to it and says See there! That is what we call the ‘‘Sun’’ the Sun is not the Object of that sign. It is the Sign of the sun, the word ‘‘sun’’ that his declaration is about; and that word we must become acquainted with by collateral experience. (1958/8:138)
30 Another example Peirce gives is a portrait with the subject's name printed below it. The portrait can convey information only if the person looking at it knows whom the name represents; if not, then it represents what the name of the person looked like. In this manner, the text also functions as graphics. Peirce claimed that a sign can only be understood if the interpreter has ‘‘collateral acquaintance’’ with the object (1958/8: 139). Peirce does not discuss in depth what is meant by ‘‘collateral acquaintance’’ or ‘‘collateral experience.’’ These terms seem to convey social convention or, as Eco believes, they refer to the fact that a sign conveys its meaning to a given community by convention. These terms also make reference to Peirce's term 'habit'.3 The Interpretant, like the Object, has a dual nature (Zeman 1977: 25). Peirce's concept of the Interpretant is expressed in the following statement:
3233The Sign creates something in the Mind of the Interpreter, which something, in that it has been so created by the sign, has been, in a mediate and relative way, also created by the Object of the Sign, although the Object is essentially other than the Sign. And this creature of the sign is called the Interpretant. (1958/8:136)
34 According to Peirce, the Interpretant is created by the Sign which is determined by the Object and given meaning by the ‘‘Interpreting Mind’’ (1958/8 Ibid: 136). The meaning is taken from observation and the interpreter must have previous knowledge of what the sign denotes. The sign or sentence ‘‘Hamlet was mad.’’ provides another example. A person will understand the meaning of the sentence only if the person interpreting it is acquainted with the mental condition known as ‘‘madness.’’ This knowledge is obtained through experience and previous knowledge by observing or reading the culturally correct definition of a madman. To Peirce, this is known as ‘‘collateral observation’’ (Ibid: 136). He claimed that ‘‘collateral observation’’ is not a part of the Interpretant.
35 The main function of the Interpretant is the manner in which different subjects combine as represented by the sign and their relationship to one another. Peirce does not give any detailed explanation of how this is to be achieved, but he gives the example of a genre painting —a humble, domestic scene—as such a Sign. He claimed that most of what is understood in a painting arises from the person's familiarity with the customs represented in the painting. The clothing, he claimed, is not part of the significance or ‘‘the deliverance’’ of the painting; it only conveys the subject. The subject and the object are identical. Peirce never states exactly in what sense the significance of the painting is the ‘‘sympathetic element’’ familiar to the Interpreter. He claimed this was another Interpre- tant of the Sign (1958/8:136-7).
36 Peirce's Index, Symbol and Icon
37 The three relata of Peirce's semiosis —the sign, object and interpretant—define his three trichotomic divisions of the sign. In the first division are the categories of qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns.4 The second division is comprised of the categories of Icons, Symbols, and Indices. The third division contains the categories of rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments.5 These three trichotomies represent the ten classes of signs that he later developed into sixty-six classes (Peirce 1958/8: 228--30). The second division, which consists of Icons, Symbols, and Indices, falls into Peirce's science of logic category known as Speculative Grammar,6 which includes the meaning of signs (Fitzgerald 1966: 37). Peirce's concept of Speculative Grammar can be summed up as:
4142…an analysis of the nature of assertion, which rests upon observations, indeed, but upon observations of the rudest kind, open to the eye of every attentive person who is familiar with the use of language and which, we may be sure no rational being able to converse at all with his fellows, and so to express a doubt of anything, will ever have any doubt. (Almeder 1980: 23)
43 In summary, Peirce is stating that icons, symbols, and indices include the connection a person may make: Through the conventions and expressions of language, a person forms a link with the object or idea being observed. Therefore, Peirce argued, signs are made known through observation, experience and convention.
44 Peirce's Icon
45 Peirce defines an icon as a sign that refers to a particular object by a similarity of characteristics. In Peirce's icon, the main emphasis is a comparison of two qualities. These qualities become similar when they are situated in the context of a comparison in the interpreter's mind (Fitzgerald 1966: 47). Peirce states:
4647An icon is a representamen of what it represents and for the mind that interprets it as such, by virtue of its being an immediate image, that is to say by virtue of characters which belong to it in itself as a sensible object, and which it would possess just the same were there no object in nature that it resembled, and though it never were interpreted as a sign. (1960/4: 359)
48 Peirce posits a similarity here between the icon and its object, a similarity that is found in the ‘‘sign vehicle’’ itself (Fitzgerald 1966: 49). This definition of an icon is also a definition of an iconic sign vehicle. The division of the sign vehicle into an icon, an index and a symbol is based upon the relationship that exists between the sign vehicle and its object; this relationship may exist before the sign is used (Ibid-. 51).
49 Peirce's offers the following definition of an icon as it relates to its object:
5051An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless there is such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign; but this has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it a quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it. (1960/2:143)
52 Peirce gives another definition of the icon:
5354A pure icon can convey no positive or factual information; for it affords no assurance that there is any such thing in nature. But it is of the utmost value for enabling its interpreter to study what would be the character of such an object in case any such did exist. (1960/4: 359)
55 The icon does not represent how things are in fact, but discloses certain characteristics of an object whether it is present or not (Fitzger- aldl966:52). Peirce argued that icons are not necessarily realistic images. They may be based upon resemblance and the sharing of certain properties between a sign and its object. He includes as icons such things as graphs, diagrams, maps, metaphors, algebraic expressions, hieroglyphics, and syntax (Innis 1985: 2).
56 An icon may relate to an actual physical object such as a sculpture, a painting, or an artifact, which can bring iconic relations to an interpreter's mind (Fitzgerald 1966: 54). An icon may also be a drawing of a ‘‘statue, pictorial composition, architectural elevation, or piece of decoration, by the contemplation of which he can ascertain whether what he proposes will be beautiful and satisfactory’’ (Peirce 1960/2: 159). The idea is not, however, a pure icon because the image created in the mind of the interpreter is caused by an external object (Fitzgerald 1966: 55). This is expressed in Peirce's statement:
5758It (the icon) is of the nature of an appearance, and as such, strictly speaking, exists only in consciousness, although for convenience in ordinary parlance and when extreme precision is not called for, we extend the term icon to the outward objects which excite in consciousness the image itself, [brackets and term mine] (1960/4: 359)
59 The icon, in this instance, is the idea or the cognitive image that is formed in the interpreter's mind. The icon makes reference to an external object that exists in the environment (Fitzgerald 1966: 55).
60 Eco condemns Peirce for using the term 'iconism' in a loose manner, as an ‘‘umbrella term’’ in which he includes references to objects such as mental images, graphs or paintings7 (1976: 199). Eco believes that what Peirce is trying to define is the relationship between an expression and its content-type, which Eco calls ‘‘ratio difficilis.’’ Eco does not believe in Peirce's notion that the idea of iconism only designates the visual relationship between similar spatial properties the diagrams display. He argues that spatial properties do not stand for other spatial relationships (Ibid: 198). Eco argues:
6263How, in the graphic representation, does the appartenance to a class become appartenance to a given space? By a mere convention (even if based on certain mental mechanisms, used to thinking or to imagining either by temporal succession or by spatial proximity) that establishes that certain abstract relations can be expressed by spatial situations. (Ibid: 199)
64 To Eco, these represent metaphors, not icons (Ibid: 199).
65 ‘‘An absolute replica’’ or icon, according to Eco, is a utopian idea. He claims that it is difficult if not impossible to reconstruct all the properties of a given object; however, people possess a certain ‘‘common sense’’ that allows them to recognize similar features among objects that belong to the same class of objects. Eco gives the example of two Fiat 124 cars that are the same color but which function as two doubles and not as each other's icon. Another example he gives is the duplicate of a functional object, a knife. The knife, according to Eco, must have the same degree of sharpness and the same surface texture exactly in order to be considered an icon (Ibid: 180).
66 Most people, according to Eco, believe that icons are based upon similarities between objects, because they contain some similar features. He states, ‘‘The most prudent attitude in this case is to propose that the iconic device may possess certain elementary ‘‘iconic markers’’ and that sometimes a minimal resemblance is due to the fact that the iconic sign, even though different in shape from its object…performs the same function’’ (Ibid: 208). They believe that any similarity conveys an iconic sign even if it is based solely upon function (Ibid: 208).
67 Eco believes that in order to duplicate an object it is necessary to reproduce all the properties contained within the ‘‘model-object’’ (Ibid: 180). The duplicate must retain the exact orders and interrelationships that the original possessed (Ibid: 180). He does not explain the exact tolerances that would define a double. It seems that Eco will settle for no less than zero tolerance. Eco notes that if the object is a complex one —for example, using the Chevrolet vehicle to make a double—the principle of duplication will not change. What changes is the number of rules and technical difficulties involved in making the double of the vehicle (Ibid: 181).
68 He states, ‘‘Any duplication which does not follow all the rules of production, and which therefore produces only a given percent of the mechanical and the functional properties of the model-object, is not a double, but at best a partial replica’’ (Ibid: 181). The duplication of an object, however, is not a ‘‘pure’’ icon.
69 In summary, an icon, according to Peirce, is a sign that displays some similarity to the object it portrays. The icon exemplifies the structure of the relationships of their objects and their similar qualities. Peirce believed that there are no such things as pure icons (Fitzgerald 1966: 55).
70 As Peirce claimed, icons may include maps, diagrams, algebraic expressions, graphs, syntax and grammatical expressions. Icons also include all likenesses that may be displayed in sculptures, graphics, scientific illustrations, documentary photographs and films (Wallis 1975: 12).
71 Peirce and Diagrams as Icons
72 Peirce believed that diagrams are produced in order to lead to a ‘‘better understanding of states of things, whether experienced, or read of, or imagined’’ (Peirce 1960/3: 260). The thought or idea that was conveyed through the diagrams exemplified the ‘‘possible expressions’’ that a ‘‘possible interpreter’’ could interpret with respect to the diagram's essential character (Peirce 1960/4:10). The diagrams did not function as the thought or idea per se, but were representative of the various visual relations that were analogous to the iconic relations (Peirce 1960/4 : 348).
73 In his discussion of diagrams as icons, Peirce stated:
7475Namely, if I may try to state the matter after you, one can make exact experiments upon uniform diagrams; and when one does so, one must keep a bright outlook for unintended and unexpected changes thereby brought about in the relations of different significant parts of the diagram to one another. Such operations upon diagrams, whether external or imaginary, take the place of the experiments upon real things that one performs in chemical and physical research. Chemists have ere now, I need not say, described experimentation as the putting of questions to Nature. Just so, experiments upon diagrams are questions put to the Nature of the relations concerned. (1991: 250)
76 Peirce's claim here is that icons are not merely visual but can also express conceptual relationships.8 The diagram's relation of parts and the interrelationship of these parts combine to give form or substance to the idea. Peirce also believed that diagrams functioned as icons through the conventions a community shares.9 He affirms this in the following: ‘‘A diagram is a representamen which is predominantly an icon of relations and is aided to be so by conventions’’ (Fitzgerald 1966: 52). Diagrams are icons, but they have value only by virtue of cultural conventions and symbols. The American semiotician John Fitzgerald notes that while Peirce's ideas concerning conventions may be expressed in reading blueprints and diagrams, the reader must first be familiar with the conventions the creator used (Ibid: 52). According to architecture theorist Marco Frascari, drawings may be seen as semiotic tools as well as models of architectural representation. Frascari argues that these architectural representations may ‘‘range from survey or measured drawings, which interpret the reality of the constructed world, to construction and design drawings, which are to be interpreted for the construction of the world’’ (1991: 90). Drawings, together with the constructed world, constitute what may be termed the ‘‘architectural project’’ (Ibid: 90).
79 Frascari uses Peirce's theory of semiotic to discuss architecture. He states that the ‘‘architecture project’’ is iconic because it is based upon inferences taken from constructive architectural drawings. These architectural drawings, he affirms, are diagrams based upon architectural theory and change accordingly to provide relationships with the form to be built. To Frascari, these are the constructive drawings and they demonstrate construction (Ibid: 91).
80 In architectural drawings, architects act as observers of their physical environment and their constructed work; they also act as observers of their own internal vision. The physical construction is the combination of what the architect visualizes on the drawing board and the site where the construction is to take place. The internal world is what happens on the drawing board where the architect or designer expresses his or her own diagrams and graphic constructions. Peirce termed these diagrams and graphics ‘‘mental imagines’’ (Ibid: 91).
81 Peirce noted that the icon can reveal certain truths of observation that are evidence of construction. These truths are discovered through the process of deduction. He noted:
8283For a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct observation of its other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction. Thus, by means of two photographs a map can be drawn, etc. Given a conventional or other general sign of an object, to deduce any other truth than that which it explicitly signifies, it is necessary, in all cases, to replace that sign by an icon. (1960/2:158).
84 The icon, therefore, is capable of revealing certain truths through deduction and convention. Through the observation of diagrams, the employment of deductive reasoning helps to bring about various consequences from the hypothesis (Peirce 1960/3: 350).
85 The drawings are, according to Peirce, ‘‘theoretic (or theoremic) and corollary (or corollarial) reasoning.’’ In theoretic reasoning, a new idea is brought into the argument (Frascari 1991: 92). Peirce notes that theoretic (or theorematic) reasoning draws conclusions of the conditions represented in the diagram. It is by observing these diagrams that modifications or experiments may be performed on them (Peirce 1958/2: 152).
86 Frascari states that this notion is not new in architectural thinking or in the formulation of architectural hypotheses. Corollary reasonings, to Frascari, are the ideas that are used in the building program; for example, the shape of a certain type of plan determines the boundary lines in both the two dimensional drawing and the building (1991: 92). Frascari claims that in theoretic or theorematic reasoning a new idea is brought into the argument. Peirce, however, argues that theorematic as well as corollary reasoning are deductive10 in nature. These both represent what he termed ‘‘Necessary Deductions’’ 11 (1960/2: 152). According to Peirce, it is only possible to bring a new idea into the argument through abductive rea- sorting (1960/5: 106). The ideas to which Frascari alludes, which are shown in the diagram, are not new ideas but ideas that have already been established by convention. Corollary or deductive reasoning conveys certain truths about the diagram's construction (Peirce 1958/2: 152). The diagrams display various relationships and disclose a variety of possible translations. These diagrams are ‘‘constructive drawings’’ that demonstrate the nature of construction. Frascari notes, ‘‘As Peirce points out in the fifth article of his definition of a theorem, a demonstration is 'what traces out the reasons why a certain relationship should always subsist between the parts of a diagram'’’ (Frascari 1991: 91). The demonstrations are the signs of ‘‘architectural abduction.’’ Architectural abduction, according to Frascari, is the notion that architecture is based upon inferences that are taken from architectural drawings (Ibid: 91). Abduction,12 according to Peirce, is iconic (cf. Frascari 1991: 91).13 Peirce specifies that these abductions14 were the ideas embodied in the diagrams (1960/5: 106).
92 In an architect's drawing, the emphasis ‘‘ …is to make visible what is invisible’’ (Frascari 1991: 92). In a drawing, the architect is conveying various functional denotations so that the viewer may determine certain qualities and connotations that stem from past, present and future buildings. Drawings, as mentioned earlier, are semiotic tools that make the intangible more tangible (Ibid: 92).
93 Frascari's notion of the invisible relates to Peirce's notion that diagrams do not resemble their objects in appearance; instead it is ‘‘only in response to the relations of their parts that their likeness consists’’ (Peirce 1960/2: 159). These relations can be analyzed using Peirce's three types of signs, namely known as icons, indices, and symbols.
94 Frascari argues that any edifice may be viewed as a combination of its content and expression. He suggests that the edifice may be seen in Peircean terms as a ‘‘dynamic object’’ that motivates the sign. Thus, ‘‘designs’’ are motivated signs expressed in drawings. Frascari quotes Eco on this point: ‘‘a sign just does not stand for something else, it may also be something that can be interpreted.’’ The edifice or the ‘‘nontrivial building’’ is the physical manifestation of the process of interpretation (Frascari 1991: 92).
95 Semiosis, as seen by Frascari, operates in architecture through infinite possibilities of interpretation, incorporating graphic signs so that the architect may ‘‘remember the past, experience the present, and anticipate the future experience of the constructed reality’’ (Ibid: 93). The infinite process of semiosis is evident in the graphic texts, the design and presentation, the construction, shop, and survey drawings. Semiosis also occurs in imagined buildings that have become the stimulus for other designs that produce new constructions and drawings (Ibid: 93). Frascari sees semiosis as a cyclical and infinite process.
96 Drawings are demonstrations of architecture known as ‘‘prosperous tools’’ for the constructor. Frascari points out that drawings are:
9798…monsters within the labyrinth of the building trade, showing the nature of construction. They are the documents out of which the builders, the building management, and all the other trades related to the making of buildings derive their interpretation in the making of the templates and jigs necessary for construction. (Ibid: 94)
99 These demonstrations or tropes of the term ‘‘monster’’ can be, as the architecture historian George Hersey claims, representative of the terms demonstrant, demonstrantur, or ‘‘they are to be shown, they show, and they are shown’’ (Hersey 1988: 134--135). For Frascari, architectural drawings are technology icons that convey three of Peirce's semiotic relationships. First, the relationship between any real artifact and the 'projected icon' of that artifact signifies socially what is the 'right understanding of the sign.' This is known as the 'immediate interpretant.' Second, the relationship between the artifact and the 'instrumental icon' that occurs in the mind of the interpreter is responsible for the construction. This is known as the 'dynamic interpretant.' Finally, the relationship between the 'instrumental icon' and the 'formal icon' that occurs within a certain culture, is the 'final logical interpretant' (1991: 94).
100 To the semiotician Clive Ash win, a designer's drawing is iconic insofar as it records and transmits resemblances through the process of representation. Representation is the presentation of making an immaterial form or idea that exists only as a concept in the designer's mind, material on the drafting paper. This presentation or iconic image —the drawing—can be noted in the etymological link between the terms 'image' and 'imagine' (1989: 201).
101 Peirce—Metaphors and Analogies as Icons
102 Art and science differ in their approach to creativity. In artistic creativity, the main idea is to present a new feeling or quality of feeling that can be described metaphorically. The American semiotician Douglas Anderson states that it is a metaphor itself that brings together two or more new ideas (1987: 68). Peirce thought that both the scientist and the artist include hypoicons in their thought processes. In science this is known as an analogy, and in art it is known as metaphor (Ibid: 77).
103 In science, three types of hypoicons may be used. An image may be used in a ‘‘pictorial designation of a hypothesis.’’ An analogy is often used in diagrams and in mathematical formulae. Metaphors may be used when arguing new hypotheses; they aid in describing new concepts (Ibid: 15).
104 The notion of a hypoicon can be understood in terms of Peirce's 'Firstness.'15 Peirce states:
106107Those which partake of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors. (Peirce 1960/2:157)
108 Anderson argues that the artist may use these three types in the process of creating a work of art.
109 Eco states that a metaphor ‘‘ …substitutes one expression for another in order to produce an expansion (or a ‘‘condensation’’ ) of knowledge at the semantic level’’ (1990:139). Eco does not believe, like Peirce, that a metaphor is an icon; it is a separate entity (Ibid: 140). However, Eco's definition of a metaphor does however suppose that metaphors have iconic qualities since in order to substitute one term with another there must exist a similarity in meaning.
110 Anderson's definition of the metaphor is similar to Eco's insofar as it claims that a metaphor ‘‘…is like an image or an analogy.’’ The metaphor is similar to what it represents, ‘‘…not because of an antecedent identity or a similarity or a reminiscence but it is a similarity which it creates’’ (Anderson 1987: 73). Therefore, Anderson's concept of a metaphor is not an icon but may contain some iconic qualities (Ibid: 73).
111 Peirce thought of metaphors as iconic signs. Their function is different from that of diagrams or analogies. An analogy is a type of metaphor that is comprised of three elements: the two relata and the form they share (Ibid: 69). An example of this would be a road map; the map shares certain forms with the territory it depicts.
112 According to Peirce, words are metaphorical in character when a person combines certain qualities together with his or her aptitudes to discover resemblances or associations based upon these similarities (Peirce 1960/3:260). A metaphor carries meaning that is symbolic. ‘‘A metaphor,’’ Anderson argues, ‘‘is a symbol whose iconicity dominates’’ (1987: 69). He confirms this argument by quoting Peirce, ‘‘One sign frequently involves all three modes of representation, and if the iconic element is altogether predominant in a sign, it will answer most purposes to call it an icon’’ (Ibid: 3). Metaphors may function in some respect as a symbol and an index; however, the metaphor's iconic qualities override these (Ibid: 69).
113 Peirce's Symbol
114 In ‘‘Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs,’’ Peirce examined the origins of the term 'symbol.' The Greeks were the first to use the term 'symbol- os', which in twentieth-century terminology is the 'symbol'. The Greeks used the term to signify 'throw together', and it was applied whenever there was a contract or a convention developed. Aristotle used the word as a conventional sign or a noun. He also used the word to mean a signal that was agreed upon by a certain community (Peirce 1985: 18).
115 Peirce took it upon himself to reinterpret the term through the meaning given to it by Aristotle. Peirce defined the symbol as ‘‘…a Represent- amen whose Representative character consists precisely in its being a rule that will determine its Interpretant’’ (Peirce 1985: 16). He claimed that words, sentences, books and conventional signs are symbols. An example of a symbol is the word 'man'; it is a sign that is a replica of the word in its written and verbal form. He argued that the word in itself does not exist but that it has a ‘‘real being’’ because ‘‘existents will conform to it’’ (1985: 16). The word becomes a sign because it is a ‘‘habit’’ or ‘‘law’’ that creates a replica that can be interpreted as meaning 'man ' (1985: 16). He stressed that by a set of general rules or ‘‘habits’’ , the word acquires meaning. Words and their meanings are general rules but the word is responsible for expressing the ‘‘qualities’’ that the replica possesses (1985: 17).
116 Peirce noted that ‘‘A symbol is a sign naturally fit to declare that the set of objects which is denoted by whatever set of indices may be in a certain way attached to it is represented by an icon associated with it’’ (1985: 17). In this statement, Peirce suggests that a person associates an idea or meaning with a word that can be stated as the ‘‘mental icon.’’ The ‘‘mental icon’’ is the image a person creates in the mind (1985: Ibid: 17); this image is what Peirce also termed the ‘‘psychical product’’ (1958/8:112).
117 In the article ‘‘On the Algebra of Logic,’’ which first appeared in the American Journal of Mathematics, Peirce refers to the symbol by the term ‘‘token.’’ He suggested:
118119A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. If this triple relation is not of a degenerate species, the sign is related to its object only in consequence of a mental association, and depends upon a habit. Such signs are always abstract and general, because habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected. They are, for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general words, the main body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment. For the sake of brevity I will call them tokens. (Corrington 1993:145)
120 The sign or, as Peirce suggests above, the ‘‘token’’ is responsible for creating something in the mind that has meaning for the interpreter. The sign is connected to its object in this manner by an arbitrary and conventional act, an act of habit that stems from the person's social and communal life (Ibid: 145).
121 Peirce also believed,
122123Any ordinary word as 'give', 'bird', 'marriage', is an example of a symbol. It is applicable to whatever may be found to realize the idea connected with the zvord: it does not, in itself, identify those things. It does not show us a bird, nor enact before our eyes a giving in marriage, but supposes that we are able to imagine those things, and have associated the word with them. (Fitzgerald 1966: 63--64)
124 To support his argument, Peirce gives the example of class designations as instances of symbols. For example, Peirce gives the word ‘‘cuckoo’’ as a symbol for bird. The word does not resemble a bird but suggests the meaning of the particular genus of bird, ‘‘cuckoo.’’ This sign or symbol has a meaning comprised of an interpretant sign. Symbols have a third type of meaning consisting of the interpretant signs that they determine (Peirce 1958/8: 92).
125 Peirce's view is therefore that a symbol functions as an idea connected to a particular word (Peirce 1985: 18). It is through symbols that we associate certain ideas and objects with a particular word. He states, ‘‘Through symbols we can imagine certain things or ideas and connect or associate a particular word with them’’ (Peirce 1985:18). When we speak or write a word, it functions as a replica, or embodiment of the word that is being pronounced or written. The symbol does not carry any meaning by itself; its meaning relies upon the person(s) interpreting it. If there are no interpreters, the symbol does not function as a sign.
126 Symbolic Form
127 Form, like language, is symbolic. Form is the shape given to an artifact by human intention. In English, the word 'form' has the aesthetic connotation that is not found in the word 'shape.' 'Shape,' which corresponds with the Old English 'sceapan' and the German word 'schaffen', conveys the creative implication of this activity. Form may be given to natural objects by the process of growth and by crystallization. The science of form in nature is known as morphology, which is derived from the Greek term for form—morphe (Guralik and Neufeldt 1994: 529). However, there is no science that analyzes form in human artifacts, although there are certain laws or habits that we have assigned to them (Read 1966: 30).
128 The Greeks thought of form as the shape, outline, or configuration of anything, combined with the inner relatedness and harmony of an object (Guralik and Neufeldt 1994: 529). To the Greeks, the word 'art' did not exist; instead they applied the word 'techne,' which was not viewed as being separate from reality, physics or metaphysics. 'Techne,' according to the German existentialist philosopher and social critic Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), was neither art nor technology but was the ability to plan and organize, and invent efficient tools (Read 1966: 45).
129 According to the design historian Donald Bush, man exemplifies his cultural link through artifacts by incorporating human and animal forms. He believes that the use of nature as an impetus for creating designs enables a community to display its common values and beliefs. He explains,
130 Historic examples show that mankind delighted in the incorporation of human and animal forms in the objects of daily use, and that a shared system of such animated forms reaffirmed an understanding of the users' place in Nature's scheme and the role of these objects in the rituals and routines of a natural life. The useful object communicated shared beliefs, values, and interests. (Bush 1990: 3)
131 It follows from this that the historical analysis of a form can convey the form's socio-cultural context.
132 The English art critic Herbert Read believes that historic examples of a form's continuity should not be the major focus of investigating an artifact; the focus instead should be on what makes the form continue to survive in a given community compared to other forms. He states,
133 But …it is not the historical continuity of the form that is of immediate interest, but the nature of the form that guarantees such continuity’’ (1966: 36). Read considers that ritualistic form is refined either for its own sake or for the purpose of a certain function that may no longer be viewed as being utilitarian {Ibid: 40).
134 Read notes that in the past symbolic value was given to a form because it was similar to a natural form. Read states that ‘‘a symbol is only a symbol insofar as it signifies an unknown, or not otherwise expressible, perception or feeling’’ {Ibid: 47). He claims that there are two values symbolized in an artifact: one of perception and sensation, and the other of intuition and feeling {Ibid: 47). In an artifact created by a Neolithic human, for example, the main impetus to the form came from his or her experience. The Neolithic human gradually developed from experiencing his or her environment, from a ‘‘conditioned response’’ to the physical properties such as symmetry and harmony of proportion to his or her own body. The forms of animals, fish and plants were components of the external environment {Ibid: 48).
135 Read claims:
136 Since form is prior to human experience, we can legitimately assume that the consciousness of form was received from the natural environment of man, and then spontaneously matched in his artifacts. But it was the form that was matched, not the appearance, and it was the form that was symbolic. (Ibid: 48)
137 Read's idea of a utilitarian form that is transformed into a ritualistic form is also viewed in the same light by industrial designer Hans-Jurgen Lannoch and the architecture theorist Hilkka Lehtonen. Lannoch also believes the objects are refined to fulfill certain human desires. He argues that humans are not interested in ‘‘…designing specific forms for specific meanings,’’ but claims that humans are ‘‘…relating the process of creation of form to human needs, wishes, and hopes’’ (1990: 11).
138 Lehtonen argues that the form of an object reflects the way humans wish to control their environment. A community assigns various conventions and cultural meanings to artifacts. Form is always contained and produced within a sphere of meaning. However, the modernist or functionalist design movement did not view forms in the environment in this manner. Lehtonen asserts: ‘‘modernism and functionalism rather embody a positivistic ideal of objective control over the environment’’ (1990: 7). The modernists also did not see that the ‘‘rational’’ form was also a symbol.
139 Architect and theorist Donald Preziosi also regards the symbol as an aspect of cultural conventions. The symbol's conventions consist of the relationship between a ‘‘signans’’ and ‘‘signatum’’ brought about through convention. When an object is viewed symbolically, the main emphasis is on the meaning that is conveyed through the form or the content, known as the meaning of the object (Preziosi 1979: 70).
140 The anthropologist Harry Silver believes that when analyzing the symbolic dimension of an object, it is best to analyze the logic that motivated the creation of a particular object. This logic is responsible for other cultural patterns or conventions within that same society (Silver 1979: 279). The semiotician Mieczystaw Wallis points out that ‘‘…the object symbolized is usually something more important than the object that is the symbol’’ (1975:42). On this interpretation, the symbol is fixed by convention and is a conventional sign.
141 Peirce's Index
142 Peirce defined an index as a sign that refers to its object by a ‘‘dynamical’’ relationship. This relationship exists between the three-dimensional object and the person or subject perceiving the object as a sign. Peirce believed that an index is not related to its object by either similarity or analogy. He explained that,
143144[An index is] a sign, or representation, which refers to its object not so much because of any similarity or analogy with it, nor because it is associated with general characters which that object happens to possess, as because it is in dynamical (including spatial) connection both with the individual object, on the one hand, and with the senses of memory of the person for whom it serves as a sign, on the other hand …(1985:12-13)
145 An index, then, is a sign vehicle functioning as a sign of its object by an existential relationship with that object in the interpreter's mind (Fitzgerald 1966: 61).
146 Peirce proposed two types of index: the ‘‘genuine’’ index and the ‘‘degenerative’’ index. Genuine indices are comprised of demonstrative and personal pronouns, while degenerative indices are relative pronouns. Relative pronouns may indirectly or ‘‘accidentally’’ refer to something that exists in reality, but they directly refer to images that are created in the mind for which previous words are responsible for (Peirce 1985: 13).
147 Peirce claimed that demonstrative and relative pronouns are examples of causal relations because they ‘‘denote’’ things without describing them. They act as index fingers pointing, bringing attention to the existence of an object, a structure, or a certain relationship (Corrington 1993: 146). He stated this action of denotation in the following:
148149We now find that, besides general terms, two other kinds of signs are perfectly indispensible in all reasoning. One of these kinds is the index, which like a pointing finger, exercises a real physiological force over the attention, like the power of a mes- merizer, and directs it to a particular object of sense. One such index at least must enter into every proposition, its function being to designate the subject of discourse (sic). (Peirce 1992: 232)
150 Here again, the index does not bear any resemblance to its object, but rather is existentially linked to it (Zeman 1977: 37). It forces the interpreter's attention and directs it to a given moment of time. An example of an index is smoke signaling to an interpreter the presence of fire. The visual smoke is the pointer that draws the interpreter's attention to the fire. The connection between the smoke and fire is a causal connection that exists independently before the interpreter. Another example of an index is a neon arrow that signals to the interpreter the direction he or she is to follow. In both of these examples, the interpreter uses a connection that is already present as the basis for the sign relation (Fitzgerald 1966: 45).
151 Peirce later added the terms of subindex or hyposeme16 to refer to any ‘‘actual’’ relationship an index might have with its object; examples of these are proper names, personal demonstratives, relative pronouns, or letters attached to a diagram. Peirce contradicts himself, however, by claiming that none of these are indices because they are not individuals (Peirce 1985: 18). He does not explain what he means by ‘‘individuals’’ . His example of indices of this sort include a clock that indicates the time of day, a knock on a door indicating a visitor, or a weathervane indicating the direction of the wind (Peirce 1985: 13). Peirce included in his list of indices the pronouns ‘‘this’’ and ‘‘that’’ because the interpreter has to use his or her observational skills when hearing these words in order to establish a link between the mind and the object being referred to (Peirce 1985:14). Umberto Eco calls the pronouns ‘‘this’’ , ‘‘that’’ , ‘‘here’’ and ‘‘there’’ deictic or anaphoric verbal signs. These are similar to nonverbal pointers, such as a pointing finger or a directional arrow that have expressive semantic verbal pointers that can be extended to semantics of non-verbal indices (Eco 1976: 115). Eco claims that the pointing finger is an analysis of space that has semantic properties and spatial coordinates. He suggests that ‘‘ …a non-verbal index has the same sign-function structure as has a verbal one, the same capacity to be analyzed into syntactic and semantic markers, but some of its syntactic markers seem to be motivated by its content’’ (Ibid: 185).
153 Peirce considered that directions, a set of instructions for instance, are also indices. Peirce argued that ‘‘some indices are more or less detailed directions for what the hearer is to do in order to place himself in direct experiential or the connection with the thing meant' (Fitzgerald 1966: 60). Fitzgerald's use of the term 'thing' in this context is synonymous with the object. Directions connect the object with the interpreter. Indices put the interpreter in contact with the object or person either physically or mentally.
154 In summary, an index is first a sign vehicle that functions as a sign of its object through an existential relationship to that object. Second, this relationship calls the attention to the actual existence of such an object. This raises the question: ‘‘What kind of existing things usually act as indices?’’ (Ibid: 57). Third, indices in language can be pronouns, grammatical subjects, and or directions for drawing attention to a particular object. An index's main function is to guide the interpreter to the object intended. Indices become degenerate because they must rely upon convention (Ibid: 61).
155 Methodology
156 Peirce's semiotic system will be applied in this study to determine how Fuller structures his language. This study examines the question of whether these structural rules or codes, based upon the index, icon and symbol, are congruent with the codes exemplified in his Dymaxion Vehicles, patent text, 4D Time Lock text, and patent diagrams. This study also searches for the interconnections between Peirce's theory of signs and Fuller's designs and writings.
157 Peirce's semiotic is based upon principles of formal logic from which he derived his pragmatic principles. His semiotic, as a method, is therefore founded upon logic. Logic, according to his theory of signs, is dependent upon the icon, index, and symbol as well as the interpretant, sign, and object. Peirce classified three kinds of signs —the Icon, Index, and Symbol—which ‘‘…form the necessary conditions for the meaningfulness of propositions in a general purpose of language’’ (Fitzgerald 1966: 65). Peirce's semiotic is a logical interpretation. The sign, according to Peirce, is the object or idea that is being analyzed. In order for something to be a sign, it must produce an effect in some interpreter and this effect is called the interpretant. It is a process that occurs in the mind of the interpreter, or the interpretant of the sign (Peirce 1985: 5).
158 The Dymaxion Vehicles, patent text, patent diagrams, and 4D Time Lock are cultural signs that can be interpreted. The investigation into Fuller's sign system, the Dymaxion object and texts, uses Peirce's semio- sis. The sign process of semiosis questions what is distinct about Fuller's sign system that makes this process possible. Semiosis is based upon the sign's signification (Deely 1990: 106), production and interpretation (Innis 1985: viii). It is dependent upon experience and knowledge in the action or processes in which the sign is involved.
159 The sign does not function in semiosis alone, but is in relationship with the object and interpretant. This study will use Fuller's written texts and other critical writings about Fuller in order to describe the meanings of his texts and Dymaxion Vehicles.
160 It is also important to compare the Dymaxion Vehicle with other similar and dissimilar vehicles of the time. This comparison is accomplished through the analysis of other critical writings on the so-called 'Streamlined' era.
161 The differences and similarities between the patent diagrams, patent text, 4D Time Lock text, and the three-dimensional object can be analyzed by using Peirce's definitions of the index, symbol and icon.
162 Peirce's indices are signs that have an existential link with the object. They are signs that are not related to the object by similarity, but are related by a dynamical connection that includes spatial connections with the physical object and the language in question. Diagram letters and numbers, and the three-dimensional object, act as indices. Indices guide the interpreter to the object (Peirce 1985:13).
163 Peirce's symbols are representamen17 in which the interpreter can link certain ideas and words with them (Peirce 1985: 16--17). The Dymaxion Vehicle, patent, and 4D Time Lock text function as symbols. This analysis is made known through Fuller's own writings and through the critical interpretations of other critic's writings from later time periods. Peirce's icons are signs that make reference to an object or idea through a comparison of qualities based upon their similarities. These include photographs, diagrams, three-dimensional models, and prototypes (Peirce 1985:10-11).
165 The Dymaxion patent writing, Dymaxion Vehicle, and 4D Time Lock text function as codes that can be interpreted by using communication theory. Communication theory is a process that grounds and channels information from an encoder to a decoder (Eco 1976: 33). Communication succeeds even in misinterpretation; it is a reinterpretation process that is cyclical in character. The Dymaxion object can be viewed as a text that discloses meanings that can be interpreted or ‘‘read.’’
166 These Peircean conventions of language can be applied to the reasoning of a mythic, functionalist philosophy as it relates to Fuller's designs and writings. This investigation questions the similarities and differences between these two forms, language and design. In this manner, Peirce's semiotic offers a useful tool for applying the meanings and logical reasons that are necessary in the signification, production and interpretation of meaning found in the industrial object. The following chapter will help to clarify these similarities using Peirce's semiotic. This will be done through content and text analysis.