Chapter 28
ECOBALLISTICS: BOOMS BOOMERANG
2It is the intuitively-understood necessity pro-socially to adjust the legally-imposed debt manipulation that has been articulating itself in the ‘‘New Deal’’ administration’s general attitude and which has been aptly press-cited by Fincaps publicity men as follows:
3 A fixed punitive policy toward industry (‘‘Industry’’ is the social mechanism behind which, as a ‘‘snatch hostage’’ Fincap is wont to shield himself,—AUTHOR) with a series of Administration measures has so FRIGHTENED capital that it has proved impossible to finance most of the needed (central power station) construction. While money rates have been low (referring to the preferential rates now accorded to the government,—AUTHOR), the preponderance of the industry is unable to extricate itself, by refinancing, from the burden of predepression interest rates (usuriously bequeathed by Fincap himself in his will,—AUTHOR)—at a continual loss of hundreds of millions to consumers and common stockholders. All-important ‘‘equity money’’ for common stock, the necessary protective cushion to bonds and preferred stocks, has been frightened from the utility fields. It is being recognized at last that a policy of subsidized competition and strangulating regulation is in conflict with the policy of recovery.
4 In other words, on October 31,1937, the ‘‘utilities’’ stepped into another offensive defense, attacking the ‘‘subsidized competition and strangulating regulation’’ of ‘‘punitive’’ Administration policies and announcing, through a Committee of Utility Executives, that they are ready to offer $3,600,000,000 in construction work, ‘‘provided present obstacles are removed.’’ They failed to state that the 316 billion dollars was not their own money but the bond-thirsty accrued legal-for-trust-fund popular deposits apportionable to utilities, through the employment of which their holding company share-take would be Fincap rehabilitating.
5 This interesting announcement by U. S. ‘‘utilities’’ was made in conjunction with their effectively propagandized emergency announcement of the reconsideration by Congress of industryhampering taxes. At the same time, be it noted in contradistinction that the Tory Socialists of England passed a Socialization of Coal Bill, admitting on behalf of Grandfather Fincap that basic energy sources must be socialized in order to free from non-paying monopolymaintenance drag those operations the capital investment of which for manufacturing plant is now larger than the written off investment in monopolized land sources. Grandson Fincap in America probably had telephoned grandfather that hydraulic power was the only out and suggested unballasting the sinking H.M.S. Fincap by jettisoning "coal. ’’
6 Of course, the phenomenon of taxation, which Fincap now claims makes it impossible for him to go forward in industrial growth, was originally self-devised for Fincap’s own convenience. Taxation in the present accounting system was designed to certify a balanced budget by indicating that governmental revenue would be in excess of government’s expenditures, the revenue being predicated upon a promissory schedule of future refunding. These schedules of refunding are essential appendages to the legal-for-trust-fund bond issue that the banking fraternity craves.
7 The paradox that now develops is that Fincap, while hollering for tax reductions that apply to his own activities in order to save his increment, cannot cry for complete negation of taxation because he would thereby cut off his own nose by breaking down his bonding system with its recoup possibilities of 5 billion ‘‘smackers.’’ He will inevitably have to go back to his plea for a general sales tax. This has worked quite well since its partial inception and without undue hardship on the people. As an eventuality of the 1937--38 crisis it will in all probability be highly amplified to provide the revenue essential to budget balance. This will be large because it will have to take care of the unemployment relief which was lopped off the budget scheme to allow a reduction in the excess profits tax. It was contemplated by political organizations that Fincap would be willing to take these taxes, but Fincap immediately cried, ‘‘I’m too hard up,’’ and precipitated the state of mind of the 1937--38 depression.
8 An even more crucial paradox occurs at this point, for when the sales tax, which does work, is amplified and the population as a whole takes over the providing of the required governmental revenue, the populace will in fact be directly underwriting the government, which Fincap has hitherto claimed as his prerogative (insisting that by constitutional interpretation the government cannot spend money without first borrowing it from the banking system). In the old days, Fincap grumbled about bearing the burden of taxation and charity, but he knew that he was thereby maintaining his more lucrative prerogative as sole credit-source. The instant Fincap allows the population to become sole and direct underwriter of government he will precipitate by precedent the factual transfer ofthe credit-source to the people. The popular result will be the recognition that the government need never again borrow directly from the banking system, particularly since it has already been demonstrated that the Treasury can take care of its peak load requirements through note sale instead of through bond interpolation. Bonding gone and a broad sales tax in effect, the budget need never be balanced again. Fincap’s prerogative will have been lost forever by his own manipulation.
9 When this has happened and the populace (government) has voted in favor of the socialization of unemployment and of medical service, et cetera, because paying the bills, it can thumb its nose at the money lenders in a merry farewell.
10 Inasmuch as fashions are superstitious symbology, and automobiles, from a scientific viewpoint, have changed only in visual fashion appeal in recent years, and inasmuch as the automobile industry led the way out of the last depression, its symbolic surface fashioning may be appraised as highly indicative of the superstitions of Fincap. No one item in the current superstitious depression could be of more significance than the fact that the Fincap-controlled section of the automobile producing industry (in contradistinction to what Ford offered the public in the fall of ‘37), at its usually highly dramatic annual automobile show (which Ford never enters) did not even offer a new fashion, thus superstitiously indicating that Fincap sees the end of exploitation, and that since dyes and tools for fashion-changing cost large sums, he is planning to ride out the momentum of the automobile industry’s high production to get every penny he can out of the old dyes and then do a runaway. While the ostensible reason tendered by Fincap s publicity directors for this ‘‘stand pat’’ was the pile up of 2nd-hand cars, is almost as simple of interpretation as if Fincap frankly said, ‘‘I am pulling all the dollars possible out of the last surge forward, and am running for Bali and the South Seas.’’
11 There is no cause for wonder in the fact that the entrepreneur advertising agencies have begun the old story of, ‘‘I am not going to start with any expansion plan just now such as opening an office in Los Angeles,’’ etc., etc., ‘‘because I sense a coming depression.’’
12 The downhill symbolical progression of 1937--38 is simply Fincap’s intuitive and superstitious awareness of his own demise as industrial commerce entrepreneur through obscure bullion manipulation.